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WHEN DR HAROLD SHIPMAN was in his
surgery fabricating the medical records
of his victims, he was unaware that the
very computer he was using was
silently auditing every false date he
entered onto the medical records. Ironi-
cally, the very tool he was using to com-
mit this attempt at deception would
later become a witness against him. Dr
Shipman’s surgery computer had
become its very own digital crime scene.
Digital crime scene
Digital devices such as computers hold
a wealth of information about recent
and in some cases much less recent
activities. Many actions performed by a
user are surreptitiously recorded and
stored away in various locations, as
Shipman found out to his cost. 
This audit trail of user activity takes
place for a number of reasons. For exam-
ple, audit trails are created to assist the
user in the recall of actions at a later date
such as the recall of internet history or
recently opened documents.
Also, the normal behaviour of the
Windows operating system will com-
monly create data relating to user activ-
ity in system files such as those created
by the system restore process, a file
backup system.
The Windows operating system is
also notoriously untidy at creating tem-
porary files and subsequently failing to
delete them.
For Shipman, it was the fact that he
clearly falsified his records. For pae-
dophiles, the keywords typed into
search engines such as Google, details of
the files downloaded and opened are all
recoverable.
Actions such as these are indicative of
the user’s intent to search for subject
matter on the internet, download and
afterwards view the contents. Conse-
quently, a plethora of evidence awaits a
forensic examiner to demonstrate not
simply the mens rea but also the actus
reus of an alleged crime.
Digital DNA
Unlike a conventional crime scene, the
very existence of evidence may not be
obvious to the first person on the scene,
called the first responder. There are no
easily identifiable items of evidence,
such as footprints or bloodstains for
them to identify and preserve. 
Conventional forensics follows the
ethos of Locard’s exchange principle:
namely that “Every contact leaves a
trace”. Similar to evidence such as
DNA, digital evidence is fragile. Every
click of the mouse could potentially
alter the data on the device and thus
destroy vital evidence. Thus, if a device
such as a computer is already in a pow-
ered on state at the arrival of a first
responder they must not ‘have a look
around’ on the computer prior to pow-
ering the device down as this threatens
the integrity of the evidence contained
on the computer.
Following best practice
Given the fragility of digital evidence,
good practice and competence is vital.
The Association of Chief Police Officers
(ACPO) of England, Wales and North-
ern Ireland recently updated its Good
Practice Guide for Computer-Based Elec-
tronic Evidence. In this document (aimed
at first responders, forensic analysts and
managers alike) are identified four
guiding principles. These principles
influence many of the procedures fol-
lowed when seizing and examining a
digital device are:
 Principle 1: No action taken by law
enforcement agencies or their agents
should change data held on a com-
puter or storage media which may
subsequently be relied upon in court.
 Principle 2: In circumstances where a
person finds it necessary to access
original data held on a computer or
on storage media, that person must be
competent to do so and be able to give
evidence explaining the relevance
and the implications of their actions.
 Principle 3: An audit trail or other
record of all processes applied to
computer-based electronic evidence
should be created and preserved. An
independent third party should be
able to examine those processes and
achieve the same result.
 Principle 4: The person in charge of
the investigation (the case officer) has
overall responsibility for ensuring
that the law and these principles are
adhered to.
The training and experience of the
analyst undertaking the work has
always bore witness to their compe-
tence. More recently, the Council for the
Registration of Forensic Practitioners
has formed a digital forensics specialty
to provide a peer review system for ana-
lysts.
Blinded by the science
The bewildering array of terminology
associated with computers is sometimes
used in an attempt to mislead. Anyone
involved in digital forensics must famil-
iarise themselves with terms such as
sectors, clusters, live and deleted files,
slack space and timestamps.
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On a computer, data is typically stored
on a device called a hard disk. Data is
stored in one or more equally sized areas
called sectors. This is similar to your
average high street that contains a mix-
ture of small businesses occupying a sin-
gle address on the street and the larger
businesses that occupy several
addresses on the street. Files that are too
big to fit into a single sector will over-
flow into further sectors. 
Because there are so many sectors to
address on a computer, they are read
from and written to typically in multi-
ples of four sectors at a time. These
grouped sectors are called clusters. Clus-
ters that are associated with a file are
known as allocated clusters, while those
that are no longer associated (see deleted
files below) or have not yet been associ-
ated with a file are known as unallocated
clusters. 
Live and deleted files
Evidence residing in files that are clearly
visible to the user and can be readily
viewed with a suitable computer pro-
gram are typically known as ‘live’ files.
The average computer user will work
almost exclusively with live files. But
finding evidence on a digital device such
as a computer is not always as straight
forward as looking at the live files
located on a hard disk. It is common for
data that is evidentially significant to be
located in areas that are far less familiar
to the average computer user.
Files moved to the recycle bin are not
deleted from the computer immediately.
Under normal circumstances, when the
user deletes a file on a modern Windows
computer, the file is initially moved to a
special folder called the recycle bin. If
the user then empties the recycle bin the
sectors that were allocated to that file are
freed up for use by any new or existing
files.
This means when the user clicks on
the recycle bin folder to view its contents
the file will appear to have disappeared
from the list of files contained within it. 
Although the file no longer appears in
the folder, it is not actually deleted. It
remains on the disk until it is
overwritten by another file. An analogy
of this situation is when you decide you
no longer want to keep that two-hour
movie on your VHS tape you recorded.
You cross out the title on the spine label
but do not erase the tape.
Instead you put it to one side for reuse
another time. In the case of the file on the
hard disk, it too remains untouched on
the disk. Thus, any data found in this
area at one time belonged to a file, which
has since been deleted but now resides
in the unallocated clusters of the disk.
When new data being written to a
hard disk does not completely overwrite
the old data within a cluster (remember,
the computer reads and writes to the
hard disk in multiples of four sectors)
then the data that has not been overwrit-
ten is said to reside in the slack space of a
file.
Returning to our VHS analogy, imag-
ine you take that tape with the two-hour
movie on it and then recorded over it
from the beginning again with a
30-minute programme. The 90 minutes
of footage following the new pro-
gramme is data from the ‘slack space’.
Typically, one of the key elements to
an indictment is the date and time of the
offence. Digital evidence such as files
that are exhibited will be produced with
a number of associated dates and times
(collectively known as timestamps). The
basic timestamps are:
 Date created
The timestamp of when the file first
existed on the current hard disk. Usu-
ally, this is the true date and time the
file was indeed created, but if the file is
copied to a new hard disk, then the
date created value will change to the
timestamp of this event.
 Date last modified
The timestamp of when data was last
written to the file.
 Date last accessed
Not simply the timestamp of when the
file was last read by the user, but also
the date and time it was accessed by
the Windows operating system or a
program such as an anti-virus applica-
tion.
State of the digital art
One of the most exciting areas of
research in the world of digital forensics
is the analysis of live data, also known as
live forensics.
Conventional forensics is a ‘post-
mortem’ process whereby the data con-
tained on a digital device such as a hard
disk is examined after the power has
been removed. Live forensics is con-
cerned with the acquisition and exami-
nation of data contained in the volatile
memory of a device that is in a powered
on state. Once power is removed, such
data is lost.
Data such as recently entered pass-
words, documents written but not saved
or even encrypted files that are open in
an unencrypted state are examples of the
kind of data that could be retrieved from
the volatile memory (also known as ran-
dom access memory or RAM).
To extract a copy of the memory on a
live device such as a computer typically
involves making changes to the data in
the device’s memory so it is therefore
necessary to ensure that principle 2 of
the ACPO guidelines is adhered to.
This makes the competence of the ana-
lyst and principle 3, the generation of a
detailed audit trail, even more impor-
tant. 
In recognition of this newly emerging
area of digital forensics, the recently
updated ACPO guidelines has a new
section specifically dealing with the
seizure of live evidence.
When live data is analysed and cap-
tured on a suspect computer the impact
and behaviour of any commands and
programs executed must be known and
thoroughly understood by the forensic
computer analyst.
Therefore, only trusted specialised
tools should be used to conduct the pro-
cedures. All actions performed should,
of course, be documented to comply
with principle 3. 
Conclusions
Many of the actions you perform on a
computer are silently recorded. Eviden-
tially, this data can show the actions and
the intentions of the suspect. Like DNA,
it is also fragile and so competence and
procedure are vital. The use of live foren-
sics is a growing field of investigation
and although still in its infancy, has now
become part of the nationally accepted
best practice.
 Ian Kennedy is a forensic computer analyst





sectors at a time’
SJ_Litigsupp2007_1-2_police  30/08/07  11:42 AM  Page 6
